Tuesday, December 12, 2006
About Cortisone Injections In Spanish
The race in the East 1 / 2
The recent awarding of the Legion of Honour to Vladimir Putin talking. This decoration has nothing surprising when one knows the diplomatic approach of President Chirac. To understand the reasons for this attitude, which was the ranting Atlanticist and presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, we must go back in time.
This article traces nearly 20 years of geopolitics in Eastern Europe. This is a view of the struggle for influence in Eastern Europe and the collapse of European ambitions. Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (hereinafter: CEE) created in the fall of the Berlin Wall, a large intake of air which responded more or less rapidly and intensely all the major Western powers. The region is then re-shape and secure (from a military standpoint, but also legal and economic). Germany, in the best position in 1989, will toast its strengths and leave the area to the lust of the great powers. The European Union (hereinafter EU) could take the opportunity to emerge as key player in the diplomatic arena, will miss the boat, to the chagrin of the French, political drivers of it.
I The German ambitions: In the euphoria of the 90s to the 2000s procrastination
According Edouard Husson, German is an obsession to try to stabilize the area as it left the Soviet bloc. "In the spirit of economic and political leaders German, this is for Germany to regain its old sphere of influence. When you look at the extension of the European Union, it is to find the sphere of influence of Prussia and Austria. Which incorporates both Scandinavia (Sweden, Finland), Baltic countries (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia), Central Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary) and the Balkans (former Yugoslavia, Macedonia) "Does he declares in the article German Crisis, European crisis, [http://www.diploweb.com/p5husson3.htm/]. Germany leads in H. Kohl (1982-1998) an ambitious, which will prove clearly presumptuous in the years 1994-95.
In 1989, Germany is investing heavily in the East, both politically and economically. Russia greatly benefits from the "politics of Deutchmark", which allows Germany to glean more licenses. And Gorbachev, originally very reluctant to join the East Germany to NATO will shrink more zeros on the check. Mitterrand, who was not prepared for a unified Germany and fears of thus lose its influence over its neighbor, which Moscow hopes to end oppose. Kohl, aware of the metamorphosis that will take place in the CEECs, hopes to influence the transition to his favor: "He has tended to expand the settlements and the German power in Central and Eastern Europe at the expense of Russia. H. Kohl has repeatedly told Boris Yeltsin that Germany was the best friend of Russia. This did not, at the same time, the German Foreign Minister Klaus Klinkel to spend her time visiting the governments of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, to discuss cooperation and investments. The Balkans are of the view that one of the most famous examples and more ambiguous, but we could multiply the examples. [Edouard Husson Crisis in German, European crisis http://www.diploweb.com/p5husson3.htm/]). crisis of Yugoslavia 94-95 is an opportunity to see the United States frustrated with the position taken by Germany which makes not resolve the conflict.
B: 95-2003: Time for realism about the limits of German ambitions:
Chancellor Schroeder came to power in 1998 and discusses the situation with realism: hopes that German reunification is an opportunity are exaggerated. It's really a money pit, and reunification was too brutal and too vexatious. The French delay that has increased up to 1996 has encouraged Russia has managed to forget a time, and whose new president to handle (2000: election of Vladimir Putin) attempts of France by proposing an alliance to reverse cons Germany. French diplomacy can not resist this argument and Putin is rapidly taking over. Moreover, in spring 2001, after collecting the limits of its influence in the Council of Nice, Moscow primer activation of its links with the United States to play competitive EU / USA. With these, the pickings are slim but Russia negotiates skillfully face to face and divide the EU, while Germany remains convinced that it is imperative to guarantee the security of Europe is the combining and continues the questionable technical assistance. [See article Masada: The following technical assistance Western Russia to broadcast on http://www.diploweb.com/]. Alexei Arbatov
said at a press conference on March 5, 2001 before the Duma Committee on Defense: "In Russia bilateral relationship is stronger than any other partner. All others are lower. Russia also can not find it in front of united fronts of states that go against Russian interests ... . Schroeder is a diplomat with the U.S. and finds in them an ideal partner in the declaration of unlimited solidarity following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Americans are in competition with Germany in the CEE countries, where they enjoy the favorable image of winners of communism, but agree to intimidate Russia in exchange for the Advancement of CEEC membership in NATO.
http://www.diploweb.com/cartes/natotan2004verluise.htm
Copenhagen 2002: EU summit which finalizes enlargement to the CEECs in May 2004. Germany will finally reap the benefits of 'soft hegemony' (a word of Joseph Fischer). which was to facilitate the transition of CEE countries by establishing FDI, and to improve its image, moving away in Russia in order to print its sphere of influence, and by including them in an integrated economic zone that helps preserve the Rhineland model. But in 2002 Germany was in economic difficulties, partly because of the adverse speculation that followed Sept. 11, partly for structural reasons, the Rhineland model is undermined by the international social dumping. After skillful maneuvers that allowed him to print his line on European policy and impose the enlargement as evidence of a continuation of German reunification, there she is forced to resort to systematic consultation of its European partners, which should give him the means to conclude its policy. This is an opportunity to renew ties with France but the French-German friendship is undoubtedly affected.
PS: This article is a summary of articles from http://www.diploweb.com/
Johan is the author of a memoir in 2005 "EU Enlargement to the CEEC and legal rigidities geopolitical realities, economic and social. "
Run for the East 2 / 2
This article follows the article: Race to the East 1 / 2
In it, we followed the German frustrated ambitions of 'soft hegemony'. This article takes up the drama when the diplomatic crisis over Iraq and described the collapse of political Europe.
PECO II, Russia and the United States resumed the hand: the EU is becoming a Free Trade Area (FTA) luxury which their mutual influence to be exerted:
Germany goes beyond that a simple competition to the United States by resuming its independence vis-à-vis Washington in the first quarter of 2003, after the rider refused the United States a German contingent in Afghanistan and after enlargement on 1 May 2004 acquired the Copenhagen summit in 2002. According to some analysts, this would even the chancellery that have inspired the opposition of France to the preemptive attack on Iraq. Germany marks his divergence on the intervention of the private agreement of the UN, following a Jacques Chirac in the lead, and soon joined by China and Russia.
"Hegemony soft" water is the benefit of CEE emerging requirements of the CFSP, and Russia, which has a new point to make: its bridgehead Kaliningrad exclave Russian overlooking the Baltic Sea and borders with Poland and Lithuania. This is the hub of criminal trafficking in which Moscow closes his eyes, conscious of the weakening of the EU that it generates. Kaliningrad is also the reason given by Russia to ensure long term derogations from the Schengen area, after the transit facilities it got face to face with Lithuania (the latter was awaiting a response from the EU side to Russian pressure to obtain a right of passage through Belarus).
http://www.diploweb.com/cartes/qi7.htm
Despite this, Germany believes it can make again play the politics of Mark, which is not guaranteed to work against the return of the concept of "common European home" Gorbachev that Moscow is gradually up to date under the cover of the possibility of accession Russia to the EU. This membership does not actually function to be realistic, but to remember instead of the sphere in the Russian zone. Anyway, the German position in the East actually seems more fragile than expected, and its latent dispute with Russia were exacerbated by its competitor in the race for the Russian markets: Washington recalled CEECs their apprehension about the Russian ogre. In this game, it is the United States the strongest, as evidenced by the various "color revolutions" across the Atlantic with an orchestrated scenario now perfectly honed (Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, Rose in 2003 in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Lebanon in 2005). What about secret CIA prisons in Romania (which joined the EU January 1, 2007)?
The Iraq crisis of 2002-2003 revealed acute differences of opinion which exist in Europe on European Security Policy (CFSP). Although Germany has promoted accession CEE countries to NATO, but it did not intend to empty the CFSP his entire military function tool of conflict resolution outside the EU, including the nationalist unrest from the melting of the Soviet bloc (particularly in the Balkans, but also in Chechnya and in former satellite states wishing to escape the Russian fold). France sees this structure as the result of the belated but firm PED (European Defence Policy), which should lead to an EU that speaks and acts with one voice at international level. CEE countries, they do design as an instrument of internal security, NATO is the military treaty central Europe, and the field outside the EU. In reality, this discussion sheds light on the clear understanding of their operating requirements of the CEECs and their desire not to risk the double aspect of external security, logical in view of their lack of ambition for power.
In the end, despite being coveted advantage of the actors, the CEECs seem to have relatively well served their interests (obtaining an FTA and Luxury Community aid), but remain fragile in their bilateral relations against Russia and the United States. They thus rely on the EU, within the institutions which they have negotiated an important institutional role, to bargain collectively against the major powers on the most critical issues. Casually, the EU leaders are proving to be tough negotiators, including through iconic characters such as Romano Prodi, who has stood out the directives of the Italian Prime Minister S. Berlusconi, is exemplary of independence. May be the loss of their role as stake PECO serves, but they have substituted a place in an integrated market, and NATO membership after the first quarter of 2003 proved their motivation to join. Today
France and the United States is always boiled, despite a thaw in relations. Jacques Chirac openly dredge Moscow, which has the oil needed to conduct a so-called "culture war" against the Arab-Muslim countries (terminology that actually conceals far more prosaic considerations of both sides behind the facades ideological refugees).
Besides the decoration of the Russian President has cleverly re-nationalized much of its gas, one can notice the weakness of the protests at the brutal murder of a journalist pro Chechen until recently the Soviet advantage that Americans still presented as the liberators of Nazi-occupied Europe, and the inauguration in May 2005 of a gigantic statue of General de Gaulle in Russia.
Conclusion:
strategies alone 'French and German have destroyed almost all hope of European diplomacy, even of a political Europe. It therefore remains an economic Europe, leaving the former superpowers free to expand their influence within the EU. This may explain why the EU is currently the best Trojan horse to bring down the Rhine model by typing their Achilles heel: the office, and using as a weapon dumping (tax, as in Luxembourg or England office in the East). In exchange, hoping to regain the CEEC regional powers. As for a political Europe, she is currently at its worst. The French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty did not help.
Can we regenerate the EU policy? Hardly: the link between membership and economic and social policy is broken. A directory of major, desired by N. Sarkozy and more commonly called "hard core "Would have probably found a good support in" collaborations enhanced "under the Constitutional Treaty.
Everything is redone. An opportunity or a calamity? A New European Union is it possible on the basis of the fight against dumping (economic, social, environmental, fiscal, legal and judicial)? Time will tell.
PS: This article is a summary of articles from http://www.diploweb.com/
Johan is the author of a memoir in 2005 "EU Enlargement to the CEEC and legal rigidities geopolitical realities, economic and social. "
Agoravox Published:
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